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decision to make, but counsel should anticipate the decision in advance and begin "shaping up" the closed corporation even though
years remain before the conversion.
R.

MARTIN ROCKWELL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE EXPANDING RIGHT TO CRITICIZE: A POST-TIMES
ANALYSIS
The constitutional guaranteesrequire, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.
-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
With this holding the United States Supreme Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan' set in motion a wave of legal doctrine that has
swept away many of the traditional concepts of libel. The outer limits
of this and subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court and lower
courts in this area as to what is a "public official," "official conduct,"
and "actual malice" are undefined, and the ultimate expansion unknown.
This note will explore the holdings of the Supreme Court beginning with Times and subsequent cases, and then survey the impact
of these decisions on the lower federal and state courts. An elaboration of the standards that these lower courts have developed will be
undertaken as to who and what is a "public official" and the difficulties encountered with damages and "actual malice" within the constitutional standards promulgated by the Court. Finally, a workable
and fair set of standards will be suggested and applied to two cases
2
awaiting decision by the Court.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
87 Sup. Ct. 30 (1966) (No. 37); Associated Press v. 'Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 40 (1966) (No. 150).
1.
2.
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SUPREME COURT CASES

The victim of the alleged libel in Times was L. B. Sullivan, one
of the three elected commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama. Clearly by virtue of his elected position and responsibility to
the voters of Montgomery, Sullivan was a person who could be termed
a "public official." The alleged libelous matter was in a paid advertisement published by the New York Times entitled "Heed Their
Rising Voices." The advertisement described a "wave of terror" unleashed by the "police" and others against Southern Negroes who were
trying to gain full recognition of their civil rights. Included in the
generic term "police" were those of Montgomery for whom Sullivan,
as commissioner, was responsible, although he was never mentioned
by name in the advertisement.
At trial, Sullivan made no effort to prove that he had suffered
any actual pecuniary loss as a result of the libel,3 nor was it necessary
that he do so under Alabama law, the libel being "per se." That is,
the words in question were published "of and concerning" him and
tended to bring him into public contempt and injure his reputation.
In such cases Alabama law presumes damage; none need be shown. 4
Once libel per se was established by the lower court, petitioner's only
defense under Alabama law was to prove the statements true in all
particulars. 5 The jury awarded Sullivan 500,000 dollars, and the trial
court's decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. 6
The United States Supreme Court in Times discussed the long
history of free speech and open debate on public issues and indicated
that there exists a "national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 7 The Court
rejected respondent's contention based on Valentine v. Chrestensens
that the statements were published as part of a paid "commercial"
advertisement and thus not protected by the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and press. It held the advertisement was not
"commercial" in the Chrestensen sense in that it "communicated
information, expressed opinions, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964).
Id. at 262.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
Ibid.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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and concern." 9 In addition to recognizing the important purposes
of the alleged defamatory material, the Court indicated that "editorial" advertisements serve as important outlets for personal and
public grievances and that if the New York Times were held responsible in this case other newspapers would be hesitant to print such
advertisements. Against this background of national commitment
to open debate on public issues, the public's widespread interest in
the alleged defamatory matter itself, and the special concern of the
defendants in the character of the alleged libelous matter, the Alabama rule of law was held unconstitutional as violating the first
amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press.
The defense of truth under the Alabama rule was deemed insufficient. 1° The Court felt that a rule of law requiring a critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of his statements amounted to
self-censorship and would deter not merely false speech but all speech
because of doubt whether truth could be proved in court or fear of
the expense of having to defend a defamation suit. Thus, the mere
fact that the statements claimed to be libelous are false, as some were
in Times, does not foreclose constitutional protection; the additional
test of actual malice must be met before recovery for libel will be
allowed.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court found that
the mere presence of material in the files of the New York Times
showing the falsity of certain statements in the advertisement did
not establish the state of mind required for "actual malice"" (that
is, knowledge of the falsehood or reckless disregard of truth or falsity)
with the "convincing clarity" that the constitutional standard demands. The evidence, the Court held, was also insufficient to support
the jury's finding that the statements were "of and concerning" the
plaintiff. The mere fact that Sullivan was commissioner and supervisory head of the police department did not necessarily prove that the
attack on the "police" focused on Sullivan personally. To allow recovery on such proof would in essence permit recovery by an official
for impersonal criticism against governmental operations in generala concept unprecedented in American jurisprudence. Thus, the proposition that the average citizen knows that police or other governmental agencies are under a particular individual's control and that
criticism of the agency is a libel of the official-in-charge is insufficient
to prove libel.
The Court did not find it necessary to determine how far down
the hierarchy of governmental employees the "public official" designa9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 287.
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tion might run. 12 In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Black, joined
by Mr. Justice Douglas, contended that there exists an absolute right
to criticize public officials and that the standard adopted by the majority does not offer adequate protection.13 In view of the prejudicial
atmosphere surrounding the case, these justices were of the opinion
that the same result would have been reached by the trial court even
under an actual malice standard. Mr. Justice Black expressed fear
that the size of the verdict itself presented a direct threat to news
media that dare express unpopular views and criticize public
officials. 14
The next major case involving criticism of a "public official" was
a criminal prosecution, Garrisonv. Louisiana.5 It offers little clarification of the questions raised in Times as to what is a "public official"
or "official conduct." Garrison involved a district attorney of Orleans
Parish, Louisiana, who for some time had been feuding with eight
criminal district court judges. The district attorney called a press
conference at which he accused the judges of having a backlog of
cases due to inefficiency, laziness, and frequent vacations. He also
implied that they harbored marked sympathies toward certain unnamed racketeers.
The judges prosecuted under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute,16 under which even a true statment could give rise to
prosecution and conviction if made with malice in the sense of ill
will or intent to inflict harm. In reversing defendant's conviction
the United States Supreme Court held that true statements concerning
official conduct are absolutely protected regardless of the intent with
which they are made and that the Times "actual malice" standards
must apply to false statements in the context of criminal as well as
civil libel. Relying on its commitment to open debate expressed in
Times, the Court held the Louisiana standards to be overly restrictive,
12. Id. at 283: "We have no occasion here to determine how far down into
the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would
extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who
would or would not be included ....
Nor need we here determine the boundaries of the 'official conduct' concept. It is enough for the present case that respondent's position as an elected city commissioner clearly made him a public
official, and that the allegations in the advertisement concerned what was allegedly
his official conduct as Commissioner in charge of the Police Department."
13. Id. at 293. Mr. Justice Goldberg in a separate concurring opinion expressed similar feelings as to an absolute right to criticize official conduct, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964).
14. Id. at 294. For a complete discussion of Mr. Justice Black's opinion see
Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
43 N.C.L. Rlv. 315 (1965).
15. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
16. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§14:47-50 (Supp. 1966).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss4/7

4

DeVault and Geiger: The Expanding Right to Criticize: A Post-Times Analysis
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

thus preventing critics of public officials from speaking out. The
Court indicated that it might be virtually impossible to show the
absence of ill will or bad motive as contemplated by the Louisiana
law.
The Louisiana Supreme Court had construed the defendant's remarks as directed toward the personal integrity of the eight judges
rather than at their official conduct. The United States Supreme
Court disagreed, and after negating application of the Times rule
17
to conduct in which the public has no interest, stated: '
Of course, any criticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties will tend to affect his private, as well
as his public, reputation. The New York Times rule is not
rendered inapplicable merely because an official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed.
Again the Court did not undertake to define "public official," apparently assuming that the judges who were the victims of the libel
were high enough in the governmental hierarchy to clearly come
within the classification.1'
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. justice Douglas concurred,
believed that there should be an absolute immunity from prosecution
for criticizing a public official and that, further, there was absolutely
no place under the Constitution for seditious criminal libel? 9 Mr.
Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Black concurring, expressed the
belief, as did Mr. Justice Black in Times, that the "actual malice"
standard applied by the majority did not offer adequate protection
for the first amendment freedoms of speech and press; that it was far
too easy for juries to find the malice necessary for recovery or prosecution.20
17.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).

18. The Garrison standard was applied to a parish district attorney in another
Louisiana criminal defamation case: Molty v. State, 379 U.S. 201, affirming 245
La. 546, 159 So. 2d 149 (1963). In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965), the

Court, in a per curiam opinion, again offered little additional clarification to
the Times standards. In Henry the actual malice standard was applied to a
county attorney and a city police chief who sued the president of the Mississippi
chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People when
he charged that his arrest by the plaintiff was a "diabolical plot." The Court
reversed a $25,000 judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of an instruction by
the trial judge which the Court felt might have lead the jury to believe that
recovery might be had on a showing by the plaintiff of an intent to inflict harm,
rather than an intent to inflict harm through falsehood. With no discussion of
the "public official" concept the Court apparently felt that both plaintiffs were
clearly within the limits of the concept whatever they might be.
19. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
20. Id. at 80.
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The most definitive of Supreme Court decisions since Times is
Rosenblatt v. Baer.21 Respondent was the supervisor of a public ski
recreation area and was directly responsible to three elected county
commissioners. A public controversy arose over the operation of the
area due to the low income revenues and inefficient utilization of the
facilities, ultimately resulting in respondent's ouster and the withdrawal of control from the three commissioners.
Petitioner, a columnist for the local paper, wrote an article concerning the recreation area under the operation of the new regime.
He stated that the income revenues were up substantially despite
a shorter operating season and that one could only wonder what had
happened to all the money that had been taken in at the skiing area
in previous years (during respondent's tenure). Neither respondent
nor the three commissioners were mentioned by name, but by extrinsic evidence a clear implication of peculation on the part of respondent and the commissioners was evident. Respondent received a
verdict and libel judgment against petitioner. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court's first theory of reversal centered around an
instruction given by the trial judge that an implication of impropriety
or crime directed at one of a small group, casting suspicion on all,
was actionable under New Hampshire law. The Court rejected this
instruction on the basis of the Times rule, stating that in effect the
jury was permitted to find liability on the basis of respondent's mere
relationship to a governmental agency. Absent a showing of specific
reference to respondent, the recovery was actually based on a libel of
government; this the Constitution prohibits in any form.
The second theory of reversal dealt with the question whether
respondent could be categorized as a "public official." The Court
was obviously bent on delineating more definite standards, for in
granting certiorari it specifically instructed counsel to argue whether
respondent was a public official within the meaning of Times and
Garrison. The Court did not determine whether respondent was or
was not a "public official" but instead remanded the case so as to
allow the litigants to adduce proof of the specificity of the attack and
the public official issue. It did, however, set out important guidelines
as to whom the class encompasses, extending the classification at least
in the case of government employees.
A strong commitment to open and vigorous debate concerning
public issues and persons who are in a position to significantly influence those issues was reiterated by the Court. In light of this commit22
ment, the Court stated:
21.
22.

383 U.S. 75 (1966).
Id. at 85.
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It is clear . . . that the "public official" designation applies at

the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.
The concept of "public official" and the extent of its application
down the hierarchy of government employees was delineated even
further:

23

Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the
general public interest in the qualifications and performance
of all government employees, both elements . . . [a strong

commitment to debate on public issues and those officials involved in their development] are present and the New York
Times malice standards apply.
Rosenblatt may be a harbinger of an extension of the "public
official" category and "actual malice" standards to those far removed
from the realm of government employment. The two factors the
Court isolated were (1) debate on public issues and (2) individuals
in a position to significantly influence their resolution. The Court
carefully limited its holding to those who were bona fide holders
24

of public position:

We are treating here only the element of public position, since
that is all that has been argued and briefed. We intimate no
view whatever whether there are other bases for applying the
New York Times standards-for example, that in a partciular
case the interests in reputation are relatively insubstantial, because the subject of discussion has thrust himself into the vortex of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern.
This statement by the Court seems to suggest receptiveness to an
extension of the Times rule beyond persons in any way connected
with government employment. This was borne out in its most recent
decision, Time, Inc. v. Hilly5 The Court, in a narrow holding, speci-

fied that when an individual, not a government employee, becomes
a subject of "public interest" he can recover under the New York
"invasion of privacy statute" for statements about circumstances that
made him a subject of public interest only if he meets the Times
standard of actual malice.
23.
24.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 86 n.12.

25.

87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
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A comparison of the cases decided by the Court suggests several
key propositions. First, the Court recognizes as an underlying "principle" the desirability of uninhibited debate on public issues. These
public issues, for the Times standards to apply, need be neither matters of national concern nor of widespread interest; they may be
strictly local in nature. There is an equally strong interest in uninhibited debate about persons who may significantly influence the
resolution of these issues.
Second, the "public official" category is not limited to elected
persons or "high ranking" officials such as "executive department policy makers."26 It may extend down the hierarchy of governmental
employees to those positions where the performance of the employees
is of "special" interest to the public: "[T]he employee's position must
be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from scrutiny and discussion occasioned
27
by the particular charges in controversy."
Third, although all but one of the cases decided by the Court to
which the Times standards have been applied have involved persons
who can be categorized as public employees (a city commissioner, a
trial judge, a prosecutor, a chief of police, and perhaps a park supervisor), the Court appears receptive to an extension to persons entirely
outside government service, under proper circumstances.
Fourth, once the "public official" designation attaches to a plaintiff in a libel action, the Constitution requires "clear and convincing"
proof that the statements made by the defendant were with knowledge
of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.
Finally, once a person is labeled a "public official" the Constitution also requires that he prove the statements were "of and concerning him." This is apparently designed to prevent one's criticism
of governmental operations being punished in the guise of a libel suit.
LOWER COURT DECISIONS

The lower courts have shown a tendency to expand the Supreme
Court's definition of "public official." The expansion has not stopped
at "lower" ranking government employees,28 but has encompassed
those who are not employees of any governmental unit, but who have
become what could be called "public men." 29 The following will
26. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).

27. Id. at 86 n.13.
28.

Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1966)

(ap-

pointed city tax assessor).
29. See, e.g., Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th
Cir. 1966) (noted chemist); Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,
246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky 1965) (ex-Army general); Pearson v. Fairbanks Pub-
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attempt to examine the factors that courts have considered in defining
"public official," and to determine why the "actual malice" standard
has not been applied in all cases in which the plaintiff appeared to be
within the "public official" category. 3 Additional questions have
arisen concerning the "actual malice" standard itself and whether
actual damages must be proved once a person is deemed a "public
official."31

The Public Official and His Official Conduct
Within the area of governmental employees courts seem to apply
the term "public official" without analysis as to why the employee
is being so designated. Apparently many courts feel that the employee either falls directly into a "job category" contemplated by the
Supreme Court or into an analogous position. A deputy chief of
detectives,32 an ex-mayor 3 3 a municipal judge,34 a city policeman35
a district attorney, 36 an appointed city tax assessor 3 7 and an elected
member of a board of education 3 have been classified "public officials." Using the same analysis, courts have withheld the "public
official" designation from an ex-governor 39 and an auditor entitled
to join the state retirement system. 40
In view of the Supreme Court's commitment to free and open
debate concerning public issues and those in a position to significantly
influence these issues, a logical extension of the Times rule would
be to that person who is likely to soon be in such a position: one
who has thrust himself into the vortex of public discussion and controversy-the candidate for public office: 41
lishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966) (newspaper columnist); Gilberg v. Goffi,
21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964) (law partner of mayor).
30. E.g., Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965) (policeman); Krutech
v. Schimmel, 26 App. Div. 2d 1052, 272 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1966) (auditor-city
employee).
31. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Kramer
v. Ferguson, 230 Cal. App. 2d 237, 40 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1st D.C.A. 1964); Lundstrom v. Winnebago Newspapers, Inc., 58 Ill. App. 2d 47, 206 N.E.2d 525 (1965).
32. Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965).
33. Lundstrom v. Winnebago Newspapers, Inc., 58 II. App. 2d 47, 206 N.E.2d
525 (1965).
34. Driscoll v. Block, 3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 210 N.E.2d 899 (1965).
35. Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
36. Fox v. Kahn, 221 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1966).
37. Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1966).
38. Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 50 Misc. 2d 574, 270 N.Y.S.2d
913 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
39. Powell v. Monitor Publishing Co., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966).
40. Krutech v. Schimmel, 26 App. Div. 2d 1052, 272 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1966).
41. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Although the public official is the strongest case for the constitutional compulsion of such a privilege, it is questionable
whether in principle the decision [Times] can be so limited.
A candidate for public office would seem an inevitable candidate for extension; if a newspaper cannot constitutionally be
held for defamation when it states without malice, but cannot
prove, that an incumbent seeking reelection has accepted a.
bribe, it seems hard to justify holding it liable for further
stating that the bribe was offered by his opponent. Once
that extension was made, the participant in public debate on
an issue of grave public concern would be next in line ...
Both of these extensions have taken place. In Dyer v. Davis42 the
Times rule was extended to a candidate for state insurance commissioner who had not previously been a public official or employee.
The court stated that failure to apply the Times rule to a candidate,
while applying it to the incumbent, would be an anomaly resulting
in gross inequity, thereby affording the candidate tremendous advantage over his incumbent opponent. The court in Dyer felt that the
"character and qualification" of both candidate and incumbent were
43
of the same degree of public concern:
Manifestly a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny and
discussion so much of his private character as affects his fitness
for office, and the liberal rule requires no more. But, in measuring the extent of a candidate's profert of character, it should
always be remembered that the people have good authority
for believing that grapes do not grow on thorns, nor figs on
thistles.
There appears to be no reason for limiting the standard to the
public conduct of a candidate. To the contrary, there is a strong case
for applying the same standard to private conduct which may influence or effect public conduct. Their personal character may be quite
relevant to their "public" performance, a matter of unquestionably
legitimate public concern. Consequently, the context in which the
"public official" is operating and the nature of the attack on his
personal character must be examined. For example, an attempt by
an elected member of the board of education to have his son's mathematics grade changed is a matter of legitimate public concern. 44
42. 189 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). Accord, Noonan v. Rousselot, 239
Cal. App. 2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817 (2d D.C.A. 1966). Contra, Fignole v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
43. Dyer v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 678, 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
44. Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 50 Misc. 2d 574, 270 N.Y.S.2d
913 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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Similarly, a municipal court judge's "complete lack of human understanding" is a relevant public issue. 45 But denouncing a city patrolman (who clearly appears to be a "public official") as a "professional
moocher" is purely an attack on his personal character and hence not
within the Times rule.46

One court, in a very narrow reading of Times, refused to extend
the Times rule to a presidential candidate. The court in Fignole v.
Curtis Publishing Co.47 felt that Times was based on the rationale

that since a public official already enjoys a privilege against liability
for defamatory statements made in the course of his official duties, 48
one who criticizes a public official's conduct should possess an equal
privilege. 49 The court further reasoned that since this "equal privilege" was the rationale for Times, there was no reason to grant immunity to critics of "mere" candidates for public office, since they
are not "public officials" possessing the advantage of the equal privilege
sought to be counterbalanced by the Times rule. The court seemed
more concerned with labeling than with protecting the interests that
concerned the Supreme Court in Times; namely, free and open debate on significant public issues and about those who might significantly influence their resolution. At best, the argument in Fignole
was of minor significance compared with the central rationale of the
Supreme Court in Times and Rosenblatt.5 0 Indeed, the Court in
Rosenblatt denied that it was balancing the Times rule against the
rule of official privilege. It stated that the public interest to be protected was "discussion," not retaliation. 51
In the expansion of the Times rule beyond candidates to those
in no way connected with governmental employment, the primary
variable behind the rule's extension has been the context in which
the defamed person has acted or spoken. The contextual factor was
prominent in three cases involving General Edwin Walker, 52 all
45. Driscoll v. Block, 3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 210 N.E.2d 899 (1965).
46. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965).
47. 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
48. See Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959).
49. The court relied on the Times language: "It would give public servants
an unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct
did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964).
50. See Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th
Cir. 1966).
51. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 n.10 (1966).
52. Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231
(W.D. Ky. 1965); Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966);
Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. granted,
87 Sup. Ct. 40 (1966) (No. 150).
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arising out of various reports of his involvement on the campus of
the University of Mississippi in 1963. Federal marshalls were attempting to register a Negro student at the university in compliance with
an executive order of President Kennedy. Violent riots ensued; forty
to fifty persons were injured; one person was killed and property
damage was extensive. Walker was at the scene and was generally
credited by the press with having led the "riots and charges" against
the marshalls.
In this context the federal district court in Walker v. CourierJournaJ3 held that Walker had become a "public man" within the
meaning of Coleman v. MacLennon,54 a case quoted with approval
in Times.55 "This privilege [protection inherent in the actual malice
standards] extends to a great variety of subjects and includes matters
of public concern, public men, and candidates for office." 56 The court
reasoned that since Walker had voluntarily placed himself in the
arena of public controversy he could reasonably foresee that his actions would become the subject of substantial press, radio, and television news commentary not all of which could be expected to be
factually correct in view of the hectic pace of events; the court concluded that he had become a "public man" to whom the Times
standards must apply. In extending the meaning of "public man,"
the court relied on the similarity between Walker's situation and the
situation of an individual who voluntarily throws himself into the
vortex of public controversy, as hypothacated in Rosenblatt.
Not all courts have gone this far. In another action based on
substantially the same facts growing out of the same riots, 5T a Texas
state court summarily dismissed defendant's argument for application
of the Times rule to Walker. The court denied its application and
stated that a line must be drawn between individual rights and the
public's right to a free flow of information.
Legitimate public concern over issues, the voluntary action of the
plaintiff, and the foreseeability of adverse comment were also the
bases for extending the Times rule to a noted newspaper columnist,
Drew Pearson, 58 who had written columns concerning the struggle for
Alaskan statehood. Defendant took exception to certain statements in
Pearson's columns and published an editorial calling Pearson the
"Garbage Man of the Fourth Estate." The Alaska Supreme Court
53. 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
54. 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
55. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964).
56. Walker v. Courier Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231, 233
(W.D. Ky. 1965).
57. Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (rex. Civ. App. 1965), cert.
granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 40 (1966) (No. 150).
58. Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966).
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reasoned that by voluntarily interjecting himself into the area, Pearson "invited" public comment on his efforts. Although the court
denied that it was extending the Times rule, it nevertheless applied
substantially the same standards when it stated: 59
We believe that a fair balance of these competing interests
[protection of reputation and freedom of comment] is achieved
where the law of defamation permits one, without liability for
damages, to comment, criticize and pass judgment on statements made by another on an issue or matter of public interest, even if such comment

. . .

involves misstatement of fact-

so long as such misstatements are relevant to the subject matter
spoken or written about by the one claiming to be defamed
and are not shown by him to have been made with actual
malice.
Similar issues were significant in a federal court's decision to
extend the Times rule to a noted biochemist and Nobel Prize winner,
Dr. Linus Pauling.60 The court noted Pauling's prominence as a
world renowned scholar and leader in framing public opinion. Pauling had long been active in attempting to promote negotiation on a
nuclear test ban treaty, and these widespread efforts were well known.
Pauling, by his prominent position in his own area of expertise
(chemistry) and by his prior efforts in the area in which the libel
arose (test ban treaty and termination of hostilities in Viet Nam)
was in a position to significantly influence issues of pressing public
concern. The court reasoned, consequently, that the implication in
defendant's publication that Pauling had communist sympathies was
not actionable under the Times rule. The court stated: 61
[A] rational distinction cannot be founded on the assumption
that criticism of private citizens who seek to lead in the determination of national policy will be less important to the
public interest than will criticism of government officials. A
lobbyist, a person dominant in a political party, the head of
any pressure group, or any significant leader may possess a
capacity for influencing public policy as great or greater than
that of a comparatively minor public official who is clearly
subject to New York Times.
Extension of the Times rule beyond the realm of those actually
connected with governmental employment has not been limited to
persons speaking out on matters of "grave national concern" or
59. Id. at 713.
60. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
61. Id. at 196.
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interest. In Gilberg v. Goffi, 2 the Times rule was extended to a
public official's (city mayor) law partner who sought to defend himself and his law firm against conflict-of-interest charges. Defendant
had charged that because plaintiff practiced before the city court,
and because his partner, the mayor, appointed the city judge and
police chief, who frequently appeared in city court, there existed a
conflict of interest. The court drew the plaintiff within the "public
official" category on two theories: first, plaintiff voluntarily entered
into an area of legitimate public concern; second, the plaintiff was
uniquely involved in an inextricable relationship. This second theory
seems to be a logical ground for extension of the Times rule. The
3
court reasoned:6
It would be anomalous to hold that the mayor, as a public
office holder, was precluded by the New York Times case from
suing in libel on a conflict of interest issue affecting his law
firm, but that his partner was individually free to do so on the
same subject-matter.
Prior to Times, Inc. v. Hill,64 when courts were faced with libel
of prominent persons so pervasive as to amount to invasion of privacy,
they refused to apply the Times standards. 65 One court indicated that
after a prolonged period of time (forty-five years) there is no longer
a legitimate public interest to which the Times rule may apply. 6
Lower courts, in determining the breadth of the term "public official,"
have considered as especially critical the context in which the plaintiff acted, the voluntariness of his entrance into public controversy,
and the fact that he should have known he was subjecting himself
to adverse criticism and comment. Also of some importance has been
the plaintiff's personal prominence and his prior activities. One court
has indicated that the intertwining of public and private interests
by one clearly a public official, and one wholly outside the public
realm, will subject both to the Times standard.
Now that the courts have attempted to define and delineate the
"public official" concept the question arises: What should be the
standards determinative of who is to be classified a "public official"?
The problem is essentially one of balancing the individual's right
to protection of good name and reputation against the public's right
62. 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964).
63. Id. at 251 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
64. 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
65. Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d
754 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d
529 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
66. Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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to be informed and to comment on his activities-rights protected by
the first amendment. A viable compromise between these two competing goals must be established within the framework of the court's
clear commitment to open and vigorous debate on public issues.
PROPOSED GUIDELINES

The minimum expansion of the "public official" category should
include persons who voluntarily enter a controversial area of legitimate public concern and who take significant action to influence the
resolution of public issues. Areas of legitimate public concern should
include those that are of independent public interest in that they
pertain to the general welfare of the particular "community" involved,
whether it be national, state, or local. Such a limitation would prevent the Times rule from being applied to persons whose activities,
solely because of their own prominence, create public curiosity.
Under this standard, "significant action" would depend upon
whether such action might plausibly have a significant effect on the
resolution of the issue in controversy. This limitation would prevent
extension of the public official category to individuals, such as the
"little old lady," who writes letters to the editor about matters of
public concern. But this limitation would, nevertheless, include those
persons who because of their own personal prominence or past activities are most likely to have a significant impact on the ultimate resolution of the issues in controversy.
ADEQUACY OF THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD

As previously mentioned, most courts' attention has focused on the
question of what is a "public official." Of equal uncertainty, but far
less discussed, is the actual malice standard. The majority of courts
dealing with libel cases have not discussed the merits of the standard,
but have accepted it at face value without comment. Prior to Times,
uncertainty as to when liability would attach for comments regarding
activities of a public official had solidified into two fairly distinct
patterns.
Minority Position-The Coleman Rule
The classic statement of the rule enunciated in Times (requirement of proof of actual malice) originated more than a half century
before Times in the Kansas Supreme Court case, Coleman v. MacLennanr 7 In an extensive analysis of the conflicting interests regarding
67.

78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
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publications concerning matters of public interest, the Kansas court
considered almost every argument that had been raised for or against
the liberalization of libel laws. It concluded that a liberal rule was
more beneficial to both the press and a democratic society. Rejecting
the time honored argument that a liberal rule in this area would
drive men of good character from politics, the court noted that the
liberal rule had long prevailed in Kansas with regard to criminal
libel,65 and observed: "[Mien of unimpeachable character... present
themselves . . . in sufficient numbers to fill the public offices and
manage the public institutions .... 69 The Coleman rule, described
as "a qualified privilege for nonmalicious misstatement of fact on
matters of public interest," has long been favored by most commentators. 70 This rule, however, represented only the minority position
among state courts when it was expressly adopted by the Supreme
71
Court in Times.
Majority Position-Fair Comment
Prior to Times a majority of state courts had rejected Coleman
and had held that the privilege of public discussion was limited to
opinion, comment, or criticism, and did not extend to false assertions.72 This rule is said to be based on the theory that erroneous
statements of fact are more harmful than merely harsh comment,
which reasonable men would probably reject if the supporting facts
were insufficient. 73 The courts adopting this stricter rule have deemed
it necessary to protect the public from a "wayward press" and to
prevent the threat of damage to reputation deterring honorable men
74
from accepting public office.
The Supreme Court's decision to accept the more lenient Coleman
rule may not be as significant as it would initially appear. Because
of the uncertain distinction between statements of fact and opinions
or comments, the decisions in fair comment jurisdictions were some68. E.g., State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465,2 Pac. 609 (1884).
69. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 734, 98 Pac. 281, 289 (1908).
70. 1 HARPER & JAMEs, ToRTs §5.26, at 449-50 (1956); see Noel, Defamation of
Public Officers, 49 CoLuMa. L. Rav. 875, 891-900 (1949); Comment, 69 HARv. L.
Rav. 875, 928 (1956).

71. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964). For discussion and state-by-state authorities, see A. S. Abel Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267,
273, 176 A.2d 340, 342-43 (1961); PRossER, TORTS §110, at 814 (Sd ed. 1964).
72. PRoss.R, ToRs §110, at 814 (3d ed. 1964).
73. Berney, Libel and the First Amendment- A New Constitutional Privilege,
51 VA. L.REv. 1 (1965); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion. 23 HARTv. L. REv.
412,419 (1910).

74. Comment, 12 U. MiAMi L. REv.89, 102 (1958).
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times the same as they would have been in Coleman jurisdictions.7
The application of the "actual malice" requirement, in view of these
two rules (Coleman and Fair Comment) is, therefore, difficult to
determine.
Court and Jury Interpretation
Most courts have omitted discussion of the malice rule, and even
when it has been discussed, there has been substantial confusion.
One case7 6 seems to bolster the opinions of Justices Black and Douglas
that the standard, at least under some circumstances, does not offer
adequate protection for constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of
speech and press. Because the Court in Times was dealing with constitutionally protected rights, it determined that a "federal rule" of
law required that "actual malice" be proved by "convincing clarity"
prior to recovery by a "public official" for criticism of his official conduct. These standards, the Court said, were "demanded" by the
7
Constitution. 7
Mr. Justice Black, concurring in Times, stressed that "malice" is
"an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove."7 8
Attempts to define malice have, indeed, been unsatisfactory and have
led to much confusion in the law of defamation. The majority of
the Court in Times showed a willingness to support a standard stressing the free flow of information. They did not, however, yet appear
willing to accept the view of the concurring Justices that libel suits
against critics of public officials should be eliminated. The meaning
of "actual malice" and its adequacy in the field of defamation are
important but as yet undetermined considerations.
In Garrison v. Louisiana79 the Court expressly struck down the
"reasonable belief" test, which the Louisiana court had used to determine if the defendant had made statements with reckless disregard
of the truth. A reasonable belief on the part of the jury that the
statements were malicious was not regarded as sufficient. Instead,
"a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false and that it was made with the
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was
false or true." 0 In Rosenblatt v. Baer", the trial court defined malice
75. Compare Moore v. Davis, 16 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), with
Kellems v. California CIO, 68 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
76. Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
77. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
78. Id. at 293.
79. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
80. Id. at 74.
81. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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to include "ill will, evil motive, intention to injure"; again the
Supreme Court held such a definition constitutionally insufficient.
Traditionally, the requirements for "reckless disregard" are
analogous to those for "gross negligence."8 2 Reckless disregard has
been defined as: "fAin act of an unreasonable character in disregard
of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have
been aware of it ... accompanied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences." ' 3 It seems clear, from a strict reading of the Court's
opinion, that the plaintiff must prove actual malice by more than a
mere preponderance of the evidence; it must be shown by "clear and
convincing proof." In Garrison the Court noted specifically that "only
those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their
probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of
either civil or criminal sanctions."' 4 This difficult burden of proof
should increase the number of directed verdicts on behalf of the defendant at the trial court level.
In light of the "convincing clarity" requirement, the question
arises whether the actual malice standard, which precludes libelous
statements from being actionable per se (absent a showing of actual
malice), also precludes an implication of actual malice from arising
from the defamatory statements themselves. It would seem justifiable
to allow such an implication if it would defeat a defendant's motion
for summary judgment and allow the plaintiff to reach the merits
of his actual malice claim. Keogh v. Pearson,5 however, allowed such
an implication and indicated that it may also arise and be used in
proof of the issue: "As defamatory statements become more and more
vindictive, cruel and scandalous, they increasingly give cause to the
printer and publisher to take care. He who tends to disregard the
vengeful nature of his printing, tends to recklessly have disregard for
the truth.""" Whether this would satisfy the Times requirement of
"convincing clarity" is at best questionable. This view is represented
by Gilligan v. King87 which involved the shooting of a Negro youth
by an off-duty policeman and subsequent circulation of a poster with
plaintiff's picture captioned "Wanted for Murder-Gilligan the Cop."
The court stated that an inference of actual malice might be drawn
so as to withstand a motion to dismiss, but that no such inference
might be used as proof of the issue.
The need for more definite standards of proof in showing "actual
82.
83.
84.
85.

PRossER, TORTS §34, at 189 (3d ed. 1964).
Id. at 188-89.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1965).

86. Id. at 485.

87. 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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malice" is evidenced in Pape v. Time, Inc.88 The defendant-magazine,
in summarizing the contents of the United States Civil Rights Commission's Annual Report, stated that the report indicated that plaintiff (a Chicago detective) had committed acts of police brutality.
The report actually stated that a complaint had been brought alleging
acts of brutality. The court observed that the writer who prepared
the article must have known that the statements were only allegations.
It concluded, therefore, that a jury could find that the defendant had
acted with "actual malice." Compare that holding with Times:8 9
The mere presence of the stories in the files does not, of course,
establish that the Times "knew" the advertisement was false,
since the state of mind required for actual malice would have
to be brought home to the persons in the Times' organization
having responsibility for the publication of the advertisement.
The Court in Times stated that the New York Times was negligent,
but that the proof was not constitutionally sufficient to show actual
malice.
Lack of uniform standards for proving actual malice may again
9°
be illustrated by Walker v. Courier-Journal.
Walker sued the newspaper and a television station for publishing an Associated Press
report of his activities on the University of Mississippi campus. The
court held, as a matter of law, that the defendants had not acted with
"actual malice." The court reasoned that the fact that a vast number
of newspapers and radio and television stations around the country
had republished these statements was sufficient to negate a finding of
actual malice by any single publisher. Yet under substantially similar
facts, the court in Walker v. Kansas City Star Co.9 rejected counsel's
argument that because of the universality of the republication of the
Associated Press's statements, actual malice could not, as a matter of
law, be attributed to any single republisher.
When a trial judge improperly instructs the jury, or the jury
improperly applies the standard, the appellate court may review the
evidence de novo and direct a verdict for the defendant, as the
Supreme Court did in Times.92 In a recent decision based on the
same facts as Times, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a
judgment in this manner. 93 In an interesting application of the actual
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
of the
93.

354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965).
376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966).
See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
First Amendment," 1964 SUPREME COURT REV. 191, 220.
New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
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malice standard, the court held there was no malice since the reporter
could show that every statement challenged by the plaintiff could be
traced to an identified source. The case, as with the others considered
above, illustrates the lack of standards under the actual malice concept.
Had the actual malice rule been in effect in the Times case, there
is little doubt that the verdict in the lower court would have been
identical. The Alabama Supreme Court stated that the conduct of
the New York Times had impressed the jury with its "bad faith" and
"its maliciousness. '4 Nowhere are the inherent inadequacies of our
jury process, as articulated by Dean Roscoe Pound, more evident
95
than in the field of libel:
The crude individualization achieved by juries, influenced by
emotional appeals, prejudices, and the peculiar personal ideas
of individual jurors, involves quite as much injustice at one
extreme as mechanical application of law by judges at the
other extreme.
The public official who feels that a statement about his conduct may
place him on the popular side of a controversial issue (such as the
race question in Alabama) can feel confident of prevailing on the
weakest type of evidence when the determination of malice is in the
hands of the jury. Perhaps this is the reason Mr. Justice Black termed
the actual malice requirement "at best an evanescent protection."9 6
Absolutist View
In lieu of a precise definition of "actual malice," the rule urged
by the concurring members of the Court in Times has been advocated
by many commentators. Mr. Justice Black summed up his theory:
"An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs
is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment." 97 Under this theory there could be no liability for statements
made about a public official's conduct in office. Such a standard would
limit the trial to a determination of whether an individual is a
"public official" and whether the statements properly related to his
official conduct. Such determinations would be far less difficult than
the elusive actual malice standard presently utilized.
The absolutist view would recognize an absolute privilege, like
94. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 686, 144 So. 2d 25, 51

(1962).
95.
96.
97.

PoUND, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE PHmosoPHY oF LAW 66

(rev. ed. 1954).

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964).
Id. at 297.
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the one granted the public official in Barr v. Matteo.98 In that case,
the Court held that statements made by federal public officials are
absolutely privileged even if made "within the outer perimeter" of
their official duties. A majority of states have adopted a similar rule
to protect statements of their public officials. 99 The Court in Times
observed: "Analogous considerations support the privilege for the
citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticize as it
is the official's duty to administer."100 Nevertheless, the Court refused
to grant the citizen the same absolute privilege which it made available to the public official.
The rule advocated by Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas is
weighted heavily in favor of free flow of information and protection
of freedom of speech and press. The rule affords the individual's
reputation virtually no protection while in public office; this is probably its greatest weakness. No one would advocate curtailing discussion of public events, but many would argue that malicious statements
help little in resolving public issues-the central reason for protecting
them. Statements that intentionally mislead and distort fact are
arguably entitled to little protection under the first amendment.
Right-To-Reply Statutes
In an attempt to formulate a rule that would encourage maximum
flow of information about public affairs while reserving some protection for the individual's reputation, some have advocated that the
absolutist view be adopted with legislation giving a public official
the "right to reply."1°1 Such legislation would allow a public official,
who felt that false or misleading statments had been made about him
in a particular medium of communication, to answer his critics in the
same medium. Many nations have successfully utilized such legislation to enable an official to salvage his reputation without resort to
expensive and often fruitless litigation.102 Right-to-reply statutes
would present the public with divergent points of view and encourage
uninhibited flow of information. The legislation might be viewed
as merely an extension of retraction statutes, which are employed in
98. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
99. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §5.23, at 429-30 (1956); RESrATEMENT, ToRTS
§591 (1938).
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
101. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel,
34 VA. L. REV. 867 (1948); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1965).
102. ROTHENBERG, THE NEWSPAPER 114-32 (1948). The best known "right to
reply" law is probably France's "Droit de Response," which is described in 1
United Nations, Freedom of Information 247-48 (1950).
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many states to mitigate damages. 03 Under retraction statutes problems arise when a news medium refuses to carry the rebuttal statement submitted by the allegedly libeled individual. 04 This refusal
would be evidence which might aid the plaintiff in showing malicious
intent, but the Supreme Court specifically noted that it alone is "not
adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes."'1 5 Rightto-reply statutes raise additional problems. They offer no assurance
that either statement presented to the public is an accurate account
of a controversial event. The question whether such replies could
ever adequately vindicate the official whose reputation is tarnished
also remains unanswered. Furthermore, it is arguable that right-toreply legislation might have a restrictive effect on free flow of information. Because of the uncertainty in determining who is entitled
to a right of reply, the press might restrict, rather than increase, its
flow of controversial information in order to avoid a flood of reply
demands and possible costly litigation.
THE PROBLEM OF DAMAGES

The proof of damages required to enable the plaintiff who has
met the other requirements of Times to recover has not been clarified
by lower court decisions. There is also disagreement among legal
scholars regarding the required proof of special damages.' 0 6 In
Lundstrom v. Winnebago1°7 the Times "actual malice" standard was
applied to a city mayor whom defendant-newspaper had charged with
complicity in an illegal payoff. Without analysis the court flatly held
that unless the plaintiff alleged both actual malice and special damages, he would fail to state a cause of action.108 Again, without analy-

sis, a similar statement appears in McNabb v. Tennessean Newspaper,
Inc.1 9 Plaintiff, chairman of the County Democratic Primary Board,
103. FiA. STAT. §770.02 (1965) allows the plaintiff to recover only actual
damages when the defendant retracts within ten days. The retraction has this

effect, however, only when the defamatory material was published with a reasonable belief that it was true and accurate. For a discussion of other state statutes
see Donnelly, supra note 101, at 893-94.
104. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §914 (Supp. 1965) required Sullivan, as a public officer,
to make written demand on the New York Times for public retraction prior to
his bringing suit.
105. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964).
106. See PRossER, TORTS §107, at 780 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §569
(1938); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HAtv. L. REv. 733
(1966).
107. 58 Ill. App. 2d 47, 206 N.E.2d 525 (1965).
108. Contra, Wells v. Morton, 388 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1965) (actual malice need

not be alleged).
109. 400 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. App. 1965).
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had recovered a judgment against defendant for statements that were
clearly actionable under Tennessee law without proof of special damages. Pending appeal the Times decision was handed down and
McNabb was reversed because of plaintiff's failure to prove either
actual malice or special damages.
The above cases support the view that Times requires proof of
special damages if the actual malice standard applies to the plaintiff;
there is authority, however, to the contrary. In Fox v. Kahn"0 a trial
court applied the actual malice standard to a district attorney who
offered a proof of slander without showing actual damages; he recovered. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statements were slander per se and that no special damages need be proved.
Kahn appears to be the only reported case in which a "public official"
who was criticized for "official conduct" (allegedly beating a prisoner
to obtain a confession) has recovered under the Times standard.
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers"' is a Supreme Court case
that may ultimately have great impact on the question of damages
under the Times standard. The issue was the extent to which the
National Labor Relations Act' 2 preempted state remedies for libel
in the field of labor-management relations. The plaintiff, an assistant
manager of Pinkerton, claimed he was libeled during a union dispute
by pamphlets circulated by the defendant-union. The complaint alleged actual malice and libel per se under state law, which required
no specific proof of damages. The trial court held the plaintiff's state
remedy preempted under the Act because an unfair labor practice was
involved. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating that
a state remedy could be granted provided it was limited to redressing
libelous statements published with the union's knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. The actual
malice standard of Times was used in this context as a limiting device
to prevent states from obviating national labor policy embodied in
the Act of Congress.
The Court, in discussing section 8 (c) of the Act, observed that
its manifest intent was to encourage free debate on issues dividing
labor and management. 13 In order to facilitate the open debate and
free exchange of ideas declared in Times, and to prevent the propensity of jurors to award large recoveries in libel actions from becoming
a weapon in the hands of either labor or management, the Court imposed one additional limitation. It held that a complainant may not
recover except upon proof of actual damages, even though the state110.
111.
112.
113.

221 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1966).
383 U.S. 53 (1966).
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141 (1964).
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
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ments under state law would be actionable per se and substantial
damages could be presumed without proof of any actual injury to
the plaintiff. The Court further held that compensatory damages
were a prerequisite to an award of exemplary damages.
It is clear that both the "actual malice" and "actual damages"
requirements were imposed in Linn as limiting devices to prevent
state interference with national labor policy. Thus, no overriding
federal policy would necessarily exist outside the labor field. The
only case in which Linn was raised outside the labor context-an
attempt to require a "public official" suing for libel to meet the actual
damage limitation-its application was denied."14 A sharp dissent
argued for its application: "By finding Linn inapplicable in the present context, the majority is saying that more redress for defamation
must be allowed in the area of a political campaign than in the context of a labor dispute .... I personally feel that a much larger area
of unrestrained comment is permissible in a political campaign." 1 5
One method of fulfilling the Court's overriding commitment to
free discussion would be a requirement that all plaintiffs in libel suits
prove special damages as an element of the cause of action. The
desire for free debate in the area of labor relations should be no
greater than in other areas of public affairs. The special damages
requirement might also provide more realistic jury verdicts in defamation suits. The requirement would give both trial and appellate
judges greater supervisory power over juries, especially in cases with
explosive issues of great prominence.
Perhaps the most significant benefit of limiting recovery to special
damages would be to protect the rights of the defendant at the trial
level, thereby precluding the necessity of his incurring large expenses
in prosecuting appeals to higher courts for full vindication of his
constitutional rights. This benefit would seem to be of special significance in controversial cases likely to elicit highly prejudicial reactions by jurors. As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in Times: "Viewed
realistically, this record lends support to an inference that instead of
being damaged Commissioner Sullivan's political, social, and financial
prestige has likely been enhanced by the Times' publication. '116
APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS

The proposed
and the adequacy
by viewing their
the United States
114.
115.
116.

guidelines outlining the category of public official
of the actual malice standard can best be illustrated
application to two cases presently pending before
Supreme Court.

Fox v. Kahn, 221 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1966).
Id. at 183.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964).
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Associated Press v. Walker
In Associated Press v. Walker117 the Texas court affirmed a jury
verdict of 500,000 dollars compensatory damages but struck down an
additional 300,000 dollars exemplary damages. The court did not
cite Times and did not determine if Walker was a public official. The
primary questions being raised on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court are whether plaintiff is a "public official" and whether
the 500,000 dollar verdict can be substantiated without a showing of
actual malice."" As previously mentioned, in the Courier-Journal
case, arising out of the same University of Mississippi riots, a federal
district court had dismissed a complaint by Walker and held that he
was a public official within the Times rationale because he voluntarily
injected himself into an area of "grave national concern." 119 The
court reasserted that the person who places himself in the spotlight
of public prominence must be prepared to accept inaccurate or vitu20

perative public criticism:1

Public debate cannot be "uninhibited, robust and wide open"
if the news media are compelled to stand legally in awe of
error in reporting the words and actions of persons of national prominence and influence (not "public officials") who
are nevertheless voluntarily injecting themselves into matters
of grave public concern ...
If the Supreme Court in the pending case classifies Walker as a
public official, the verdict of the lower court should be overturned
on two separate bases. First, the facts (if accepted) show no actual
malice; and second, the trial judge admitted that malice was never
proved.
The jury found the defendant liable under the "fair comment"
rule. The allegedly libelous statements were that Walker assumed
command of the charging crowd. The statements were reported by
one of the defendant's correspondents on the scene. No extrinsic
evidence was introduced at trial to prove malice. Plaintiff merely
asserted the statements were not "substantially true" and that they
did not constitute fair comment. This seems clearly an inadequate
demonstration of "the convincing clarity which the constitutional
standard demands."' 12 On the contrary, it was admitted that General
117. 393 S.W.2d 671

(Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 40

(1966) (No. 150).

118. 35 U.S.L. WEIEK 3110 (Oct. 11, 1966).
119. Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231
(W.D. Ky. 1965).
120.

Id. at 234.

121.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
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Walker was present at the riots, that he did speak to the crowd from
the Confederate Monument, and that he did encourage their protests.

1 22

The plaintiff failed to prove malice, even under the broad Texas
standard.123 Under that standard Walker could collect exemplary
damages only by showing malice (malice did not have to be proved
to obtain compensatory relief). The jury awarded 300,000 dollars
exemplary damages, but the trial judge refused to sustain this award
because of the lack of evidence of malice. After reviewing the record
the appellate court held that "appellee failed to prove malice as
defined, and the trial court was correct in setting aside said findings."'1 24 But since malice was required only for exemplary damages

under the Texas rule, the failure of the plaintiff to prove such malice
was not regarded as affecting the 500,000 dollar award of compensatory damages.
Surely the person who attempts to guide public policy using the
influence of his national prominence may possess far greater capacity
for leadership than comparatively minor public officials. When that
person is criticized for utilizing his influence to affect issues of legitimate public concern, he should have no greater protection than does
his counterpart in public office. The public activities of both should
fall into that area wherein the first and fourteenth amendments demand proof of actual malice before there may be a recovery for
25

libel.1

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
2
the plaintiff received a jury
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts'1
verdict of 60,000 dollars general damages and three million dollars
punitive damages. The trial judge required a remittitur of all punitive damages in excess of 400,000 dollars. The decision was affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the defendant
had waived the right to claim that Butts was a public official under
the Times decision because of its failure to raise the issue in the
pleadings, even though the trial court decision was rendered prior

122. Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 393 S.W.2d 671, 675
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
123. Malice is defined as "ill will, bad or evil motive, or that entire want of
care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was
the result of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person to be
affected by it." Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671, 683 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
124. Id. at 683.
125. See Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966).
126. 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 30 (1966) (No. 37).
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to the holding in Times. The court noted, however, that he would
not come within the category even if it were applied. 2 7 On certiorari,
the primary questions being raised are (1) whether plaintiff lost the
right to plead the Times holding by failure to raise it at trial in view
of the fact that the lower court ruling was prior to the Times decision,
and (2) whether the first amendment affords protection for a publication that alleges that an athletic director of a state university conveyed confidential information to the opposition ."28
The case arose out of an article in the March 23, 1963, issue of
the Saturday Evening Post entitled "The Story of a College Football
Fix." It claims that certain Georgia football plays had been given by
Butts to Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant. Curtis Publishing Company's primary defense was the truth of the article. Notes taken by
George Burnett, who was alleged to have accidentally overheard a
telephone conversation between Butts and Bryant, were the basis for
the information in the article. The trial judge charged the jury that
the article was libelous per se. The verdict in favor of the plaintiff
was rendered nearly one month before the United States Supreme
Court handed down the Times decision. 29 The defendant then
sought a new trial on the basis that the decision had changed the
substantive law of libel.13 0 In denying the motion the district court
held the Times decision not applicable, stating that Butts could not
be categorized a "public official," and that even if he were so designated, actual malice was proved at the trial.
On appeal Curtis argued the applicability of the Times decision
on the basis of Supreme Court decisions to the effect that if subsequent
to a trial, but before a final decision by the trial or appellate court,
the fundamental law is changed, it is the duty of the court to apply
the new law."13 The court held that the defendant had waived his
right to plead the public official issue because the same standards
established by the Court in Times were available under Georgia
law, 32 and the defendant had failed to raise them. The court also
127.
128.

Id. at 712.
35 U.S.L. WEFK 3110 (Oct. 11, 1966).

129.

Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ga. 1964).

130. Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
131. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73 (1953); Hormel v. Helvering,
312 U.S. 552 (1941); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
132. GA. CODE ANN. §105-709 (Supp. 1965): "The following are deemed
privileged communications . . . . 6. Comments upon the acts of public men in

their public capacity and with reference thereto."

GA.

CODE

ANN.

§105-710

(Supp. 1965): "In every case of privileged communications, if the privilege is
used merely as a cloak for venting private malice, and not bona fide in promotion
of the object for which the privilege is granted, the party defamed shall have

a right of action."
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found that Curtis was aware of the defense being used by the New
York Times because the Alabama law firm representing the Times
was also representing Curtis in a libel suit filed by Bryant. Consequently, Curtis was held to have waived the defense on the specious
reasoning that the holding in Times was substantive law prior to the
Court's decision and that the Times Court merely "discovered" that
law.
Both the federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals went beyond the holding that Curtis had waived its right
to challenge the verdict and held the "public official" rationale inapplicable. In the narrowest reading of Times by any federal court,
the court refused to apply the public official standard because Butts,
as director of athletics, was employed by the University of Georgia
Athletic Department, an incorporated body separate from the university itself. The court went even further and held that if he were
considered in his role as teacher or instructor in a state institution,
his position would still not be "that of a public officer or official,
1
Such a restrictive interpretabut... merely an employee thereof.""'
substantially debilitates the
category"
official
the
"public
tion of
Times holding. Clearly the Supreme Court did not intend to limit
the designation to elected officials, as the court in Butts seems to indicate.3 4 By the nature of his employment Butts was an official responsible to a public agency-the Board of Regents of the university system. The plaintiff enjoyed a national reputation as a football coach
and was thus a legitimate subject of public interest. To prevent
criticism of such persons of national prominence would weaken the
resolve that public debate should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.
On rehearing the court noted that even if Butts was a "public
official," there "was ample evidence from which a jury could have
concluded that there was reckless disregard by defendant of whether
the article was false or not."'1 35 The position of the defendant was
that the statements concerning Butts were true and that it had exercised care by thoroughly checking every significant source of information. It had been shown at trial, however, that many of the statements
were fallacious and that there had been little checking of the information. 30 The Saturday Evening Post article stated that Burnett had
told the author that the Georgia quarterback tipped off the defensive
team by the position of his feet; under oath Burnett testified he had
133. 242 F. Supp. 590, 394 (N.D. Ga. 1964).

134.
applied
135.
136.

See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 883 U.S. 75, 86 (1966), where the standard was
to an appointed official.
242 F. Supp. 390, 295 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
225 F. Supp. 916, 918-19 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
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made no such statement. A Georgia player was quoted as saying that
Alabama knew their key play; under oath he testified that there was
no such play-this was confirmed by Coach Johnny Griffith. The
trainer, coach, and other individuals specifically denied statements
attributed to them in the article. Expert testimony revealed that the
information alleged in Burnett's notes would have been of no assistance to Alabama in preparing for the game. The evidence appears
to lend support to the jury's finding that the article was substantially
fallacious.
Proof of actual malice requires that the plaintiff show that the
statements were made with reckless disregard for truth. Evidence
offered by Butts to show the Post's reckless disregard for the truth was
substantial. Post's correspondent never saw the notes made by Burnett at the time of the conversation, did not interview a witness
alleged to have discussed the notes with Burnett on the day the conversation purportedly took place, and never viewed the game films.
No one on behalf of the Post contacted Butts or Bryant. 137 Eleven
days prior to the publication Butts' counsel informed Curtis that the
charges were absolutely false, but no additional investigation was
undertaken. An appeal by Butts' daughter that the article not be
published was rejected even though Curtis knew its publication
"would ruin Coach Butts' career."138

A defense similar to the one offered by Curtis-a thorough investigation of informational sources-was successfully invoked by the defendant in New York Times v. Conner.139 It was held that no actual
malice was shown where every challenged statement was traced to
an identified source. In that case, however, the reporter talked to
persons representing differing viewpoints and even made a conscientious effort to interview Commissioner Conner himself. There was no
evidence that he misquoted his sources or gave the information a
slant unintended by the plaintiff.14 0 In addition, the New York Times

published Conner's demand for retraction, acknowledging that the
article did not stress the attitudes of the majority of the residents of
Birmingham. In Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts the Saturday Evening
Post refused to publish a retraction.
If reckless disregard for truth could ever be established by a public official it appears to have been established in Butts. The trial judge
stated: "The article was clearly defamatory and extremely so. . ..
The guilt of the defendant was so clearly established by the evidence
in the case so as to have left the jury no choice but to find the defen137. 351 F.2d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1965).
138. Ibid.
139. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
140. Id. at 577.
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dant liable."'14 1 Notwithstanding the trial judge's statements that the
libel was "per se," the plaintiff substantiated special damages in the
amount of 60,000 dollars. 142 Under the Georgia Code, punitive damages of three million dollars were awarded by the jury "to deter the
wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the
wounded feelings of the plaintiff."'143 This amount was reduced by
the trial judge to 400,000 dollars.
In both Associated Press v. Walker and Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, the plaintiffs voluntarily entered an area of controversy-Walker
by his activities on the campus, and Butts, by the nature of his position. Because of General Walker's significant role in an area of
legitimate public concern and Coach Butts' public employment, both
should be included in the "public official" category. Nonetheless, the
evidentiary details of each case illustrate that the complex problems
in this area cannot be solved simply by considering the initial question whether the plaintiff is, or is not, a "public official."
The Supreme Court has moved rapidly toward a position favoring
expanded comment and unfettered debate on public issues. Recent decisions at all levels evidence an increased willingness to allow great
latitude to the first amendment guarantees of free speech and press.
The expanding "public official" concept insures that freedom of debate
and discussion will not be unduly limited. At the same time, the
actual malice concept retains an adequate measure of protection for
reputation and good name.
JOHN

A. DEVAuLT, III
T. GEIGER

ALLAN

141. 225 F. Supp. 916, 919 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
142. Ibid.
143. GA. CODE ANN. §105-2002 (Supp. 1965).
Subsequent to the printing of this note the United States Supreme Court on
June 12, 1967, handed down its decisions in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts &
Associated Press v. Walker, 35 U.S.L.W. 4635 (U.S. June 12, 1967) (Nos. 37, 150),
further supporting the position taken by the authors.-Ed.
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